（http://yoshiko-sakurai.jp/2015/08/20/6077）
2015.08.20 (木)
「戦後70年、中国の大戦略に備えよ」
『週刊新潮』 2015年8月13・20日合併号
日本ルネッサンス 第667回
中国研究を専門とするペンシルバニア大学教授のアーサー・ウォルドロン氏は、いま日本人は13世紀の元寇以来、最も深刻な危機に直面していると警告する。蒙古と高麗軍が壱岐・対馬を占領した当時、日本人は危機を実感した。だがいま、中国が日本を遠くから包囲し、包囲網をじわじわと狭めていることに多くの日本人が気づいていないというのだ。
「気づいた時は既に遅く、日本は身動きできなくなっている危険が大きい」と、ウォルドロン氏。
（部分引用終）
ここ数年、産経新聞や日経新聞にも引用されるウォルドロン教授は、実は何としたことか、ハーヴァード大学時代のダニエル・パイプス先生のルームメイト。
ボストンでの生育環境が似ているためか、昔からとても親しかったようで、博士論文を元にした最初の本の謝辞にお名前が記されている（www.danielpipes.org/books/Slave-Soldiers-and-Islam.pdf）し、1997年の『陰謀』にも、謝辞がある（p.xiii）。また、パイプス先生がメディアの脚光を浴びていた2003年頃には、インタビューに応じてもいらっしゃる（http://www.danielpipes.org/1268/truth-on-terror）。
昨年の中東フォーラム二十周年の記念行事でも（http://d.hatena.ne.jp/itunalily/20140510）、「なぜ中東を？」というアスナール元首相の問いかけに対して（http://d.hatena.ne.jp/itunalily/20140624）、お名前こそ出さなかったものの、「父がロシアをやり、ルームメイトは中国をやっていた。南米とアフリカは行ったことがない。自分は欧州をよく知っている。だから、中東を選んだ」と、パイプス先生は、理由にならない理由を淡々とおっしゃっていた。（自分自身に関して尋ねられると、真意をぼかして曖昧に、無難かつ平板な返答をするのが、パイプス流。恐らくは、本来は内向的ではにかみ屋の性格と、公の場で下手なことを言ってトラブルに巻き込まれたくない、と自己防衛ではないか、と想像している。でも、ちょっと物足りない、というのか、もっと気の利いたおもしろい返答を考えておけばいいのに、といつも残念に思っている私。）
世界は狭い！このペンシルヴェニア大学の東アジア講座に関しては、私的側面も含めると、もっと人間関係が狭いということがよくわかって、これまた私としては悩ましいところなのだ....
狭いといえば、もう一つ。
90歳のジミー・カーター元大統領が、脳に癌ができたので早速、放射線治療に入る、と告白されたニュースが飛び込んできた。カーター氏と言えば、今年4月29日のネゲブ砂漠のベエル・シェバで、我々の泊まったホテルに同宿されていたそうなのだ。パイプス先生が当日の午後6時に「ネゲブの部屋」でおっしゃっり、私は今、その場で取ったメモを見ながら入力している。「明日、カーターはハマスとガザで面会する」予定だったらしい。ところが翌日、移動中のバスの中で、「グッド・ニュース！何らかの事情でキャンセルになった」と、パイプス先生が知らせてくださった。
同じホテルに泊まったと言っても、こちらも遊びではないのでスケジュール満載の上、同じイスラエルでも、全くの別行動。大統領経験者がどの部屋にお泊まりか、探るほどの余裕はなかったというのが正直なところだ。第一、同じ旅団35名＋2名の部屋番号でさえ、自分のことで精一杯だった私は、全く知らなかったのだ。
でも、日本人の私としては、やはり（国際政治の現場に私も触れさせていただいているんだわ）とドキドキ、わくわくしたことも事実である。
しかし、コラムやテレビの部分発言だけで、安易なパイプス批判を繰り広げていた日本のブロガー達は、今いずこ？私はといえば、降って沸いたようなパイプス先生との出会いに戸惑いながらも受けて立つという立場なので、行きつ戻りつしつつも徐々に認識が広がり、理解が縦横に深まっていく感触を繰り返しつつ、今日に至っている。
あのイスラエルの旅については、これからも徐々に綴っていこう。興奮冷めやらぬまま、帰国直後に日記風に報告するよりは、こちらの方が実感がこもっていていいのだと思う。そのための14冊のノートに記したメモなのである。
では、以下にウォルドロン教授の見解が如実に表れていると思われる一文を。
（http://island3.exblog.jp/22484134/）
Nikkei Asian Review
March 31, 2014
Japan needs its own military might
Arthur Waldron
With China's unmistakable climb toward the status of great military power, along with Beijing's unnerving but demonstrated willingness to use that power for purposes of territorial expansion, Japan faces two sets of national security problems. These problems can no longer be brushed aside, as they have been for decades.
The first set of problems are short-term, precipitated by China's new policy of aggressively pursuing its claim to the Senkaku Islands (which it calls Diaoyudao). Some say the Chinese are motivated by possible energy deposits in the region, but my own view is that they are putting long-term strategy first.
At present China's growing navy has no good access to the Pacific Ocean, except through waters either controlled by or near to Japan. Were China able to seize the Senkaku Islands and base forces there, it would militarily dominate the surrounding area, and sail its fleet easily through the substantial gap that separates southern Okinawa from Miyako Island.
Such a Chinese military ability would threaten if not nullify Japan's control over the island chain that terminates at Yonaguni, about 110km from Taiwan, while threatening Okinawa itself.
China's need for a reliable gateway to the Pacific is the reason that the waters north of Miyako have become a regular focus of Chinese military activity. It is also the reason that Captain James Fannell, a senior U.S. naval intelligence officer, has warned that China is training for a "short, sharp war" with Japan to seize the Senkakus -- and perhaps more.
Such a possibility may seem inconceivable, but Fannell is almost certainly correct. The current Chinese operational approach is one of quick military operations to secure small pieces of territory, as from Vietnam and the Philippines. This approach is dangerous and irresponsible, as it can escalate to major war. It is, however, a fact.
In response Tokyo is doing two things. First, they are modestly increasing their own military forces to the point where it is hoped they will be sufficient to deny China the ability to capture any Japanese territory. This would be done not by fighting a general war with China, but rather by narrowly focused anti-access and area denial tactics. Second, Tokyo is counting on the United States as an ally to provide forces Japan lacks.
As an American, I admire the great intelligence with which the Japanese military response has been designed: It is limited, in no sense provocative and, in the short term at least, has a high probability of success.
I am less confident in the American alliance. As I have argued elsewhere, a close reading of declassified materials from the time when President Richard Nixon began rapprochement with China suggests that, at that time at least, the American administration was considering a future in which Beijing would be Washington's chief interlocutor in Asia, with Japan's position undefined.
Washington has a security treaty with Japan, which it has honored completely so far. Nevertheless, those in the American capital who see China as more important than Japan are growing in influence. In case of real military conflict between China and Japan, I fear that Washington would seek a middle-of-the-road, compromising position.
This would mean not wholeheartedly aiding Tokyo but rather pressuring it for a compromise with China. In the case of the Senkakus, perhaps giving them up.
Commentator Patrick J. Buchanan has already taken such a position. America's one-sided condemnation of the Japanese prime minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, unbalanced by any mention of China's inflammatory rhetoric and state-sponsored anti-Japanese demonstrations, is another signal of a potentially wobbly American position.
What conclusion do we draw? It is simple. Even today, Japan must possess, on its own, the military power to defend all of its territory, regardless of what the United States does.
Down the road
Suppose, however, that the limited tactics described above can secure Japanese territory for now -- and for that matter, that of other Asian countries China threatens. That brings us to the second question, which is how long such an approach can be effective.
The most likely answer is for around 10 years, during which time China will continue its military build-up, eventually reaching a position where it can overwhelm such defenses. As for American military strength during these 10 years, its trend will be steadily downward.
Even today we can manage, at most, one war at a given time. That means that if China moved against Japan or another neighbor at a time when Washington was embroiled, for example, in the Middle East, little or no American aid would be forthcoming, for our military assets would be overwhelmingly deployed elsewhere.
Ideally the 10 years I have postulated before China reaches a position of military superiority should be used to avert conflict. This cannot be done by concessions, which will only encourage Beijing's ambitions. Conceivably negotiations and the signing of trustworthy treaties could accomplish the task. I am, however, skeptical.
In 10 years' time China will possess a massive arsenal of both conventional and nuclear weapons. Since World War II, Japan and other allies in the region have depended upon American power and extended deterrence for their ultimate security. That means relying upon an American promise to use its own nuclear weapons on behalf of someone else at a time when the U.S. is wide-open to nuclear retaliation.
My personal view is that this promise will never be kept: No American president would ever fire nuclear weapons except in retaliation for an attack on our homeland.
My view is shared by two of our oldest allies, who know us best, namely Britain and France. Neither trusts the U.S. to defend them in case of nuclear attack, so each maintains its own minimal nuclear deterrent. Britain has three Vanguard-class nuclear submarines, each carrying missiles with thermonuclear warheads. One of these submarines is always under way, undetectable at sea, able to administer a devastating blow to anyone who attacks Britain. France maintains a comparable force. This deterrent renders each of these countries immune to attack.
It must be clearly understood that an anti-missile system, of which Japan's is perhaps the world's most advanced, cannot deliver anything comparable to the security Britain and France guarantee themselves. Defensive systems do not work well enough to stop a nuclear attack. Any system can be "saturated" -- that is, confronted by more targets than can be handled. Furthermore, modifying missiles to defeat defense is far easier than is adjusting defense to meet new threats.
These facts, against the background of a hostile China that is developing major conventional and nuclear capabilities, present Japan with problems it is not accustomed to considering, of considerable political sensitivity, but real and inescapable.
Japan's military response to China has been effective, but a nuclear deterrent is needed to guarantee long-term security.
The answer, while difficult, is very clear. China is threatening; U.S. extended deterrence is a myth; missile defense measures alone are not adequate. If Japan wishes to be safe, it must use the years ahead to develop an all-around independent military capacity, including the sort of minimal nuclear deterrent that Britain, France and other countries possess.
Without that, it is conceivable that Japan will face, at some point, a conflict with a larger, nuclear capable aggressor, at a time when it has no countervailing power of its own, nor reliable ally. For Japan, that would be the worst nightmare.
Arthur Waldron, a China specialist, is the Lauder Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania and an occasional consultant to the U.S. Department of Defense. This column draws on ideas explored in his forthcoming article "China's 'Peaceful Rise' Enters Turbulence" (Orbis, 2014).
（転載終）
パイプス先生のお友達だからということとは無関係に、この論調に私も基本的に同意する。
中国は、古代の歴史や文学を見てもわかるが、時空のスケールが大きく、大陸思考。1998年頃、京大の先生の授業を聴講させていただいたことがあるが、その頃の中国の徹底したエリート教育のすさまじさをビデオでも拝見し、当時の日本とは雲泥の雰囲気を感じたものである。というよりも、日本だって、戦略思考を実践すればやれなくもないのに、何となく根拠なき先進国意識で、のんびりと安住し過ぎだったのだ。
このウォルドロン教授は、エリート育ちで優秀で洗練されているが、ちょっとおもしろい側面もある。アメリカ人のあの世代にしては晩婚傾向だったパイプス先生よりも、遙かに後になって、中国系の女性と結婚された。また、中国でガイドを十年ほど務めていたとも読んだことがある。
でも、良薬は口に苦し。日本に対して「中国と仲良くしなさい」「日本は中国を刺激しないように振る舞いなさい」とお節介で知ったかぶりのアメリカ指導者よりも（http://d.hatena.ne.jp/itunalily/20150809）、こういう現実志向の厳しい提言をしてくださるアメリカの学者の方こそ、我々は大切にすべきなのだ。
恐らくは、パイプス先生の中東戦略や中東への提言も、同路線にあるのではないだろうか。
